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“On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy” (“Über ein vermeintes Recht, aus 
Menschenliebe zu lügen” (1797) (SRL, 8:425-30/CEPP:611-615) Few writings in the history of 
philosophy have provoked more controversy than Kant’s short essay “On a supposed right to lie 
from philanthropy”; it is here that we find Kant’s discussion of the infamous example of lying to 
the murderer at the door. Kant’s essay responds to a challenge that Benjamin Constant poses to a 
fundamental principle of Kant’s practical philosophy: that lying is always morally wrong. 
Constant claims that this principle commits Kant to the bizarre position “that it would be a crime 
to lie to a murderer who asked us whether a friend of ours whom he is pursuing has taken refuge 
in our house…. It is a duty to tell the truth” (SRL, 8:425/CEPP:611). Such a principle, Constant 
continues, renders society impossible, because it would give the murderers the right to 
information that helps them harm innocent others (ibid.). Kant’s response to Constant raises deep 
interpretive and philosophical puzzles resulting in the controversial history surrounding this 
essay. 
Kant starts by clarifying that all we can be morally responsible for is being truthful and 
not for telling others the truth as such; after all, truth is objective and beyond what we can 
control and subject to our will (SRL, 8:426/CEPP:611). Moreover, Kant explains, the aim is to 
defend the view that even under conditions wherein one is “compelled by an unjust constraint … 
[and lies] in order to prevent a threatened misdeed to himself or to another,” one still does not 
have “the authorization (the right) to be untruthful” (SRL 8:426). Then, after responding that 
someone who is truthful in response to the murderer’s question cannot be held legally 
accountable for what ensues, Kant argues that “one who tells a lie, however well disposed he 
may be, must be responsible for its consequences even before a civil court and must pay the 
penalty for them, however unforeseen they may have been… To be truthful (honest) in all 
declarations is … a sacred command of reason prescribing unconditionally, one not to be 
restricted by any conveniences” (SRL, 8:427/CEPP:612). Many have viewed this as Kant 
stubbornly defending the bizarre line of reasoning that Constant is criticizing: One has a duty to 
be truthful also to murderers who are pursuing innocent victims, and, to make matters worse, if 
one lies and the lie happens to help the murderers in their terrible pursuits, one is legally 
responsible for the murderers’ subsequent violence. 
To see why Kant is not, as is commonly claimed, tripped up in this essay, but rather is 
expressing a position consistent with his moral writings generally, we need to appreciate how the 
essay affirms three core ideas of Kant’s. First, from the point of view of virtue, lying is always 
impermissible. Second, Kant maintains both that although no one has the right (authorization) to 
lie, not all lies are legal wrongs and that from the point of view of private right, lying is wrong 
only when it deprives others of something to which they already have a right. Finally, Kant 
believes there is an important distinction to be drawn between “formal” and “material” 
wrongdoing, which is revealed when we find ourselves in situations like this one where morally 
good ways are impossible to choose. Hence, if in these situations we choose to fight ‘evil with 
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evil,’ we do not wrong anyone in particular (commit a “material” wrong), but we still do wrong 
in general (commit a “formal” wrong). 
That Kant views lying as always impermissible from the point of view of virtue (first-
personal ethics) is indisputable. It’s not just, as we learn in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics 
of Morals and The Critique of Practical Reason, that we have a perfect duty not to lie, but also, 
as he argues in The Metaphysics of Morals, that lying—understood as “the contrary of 
truthfulness”—is “The greatest violation of a human being’s duty to himself regarded merely as 
a moral being (the humanity in his own person)” (MM, 6:429 [1797]/CEPP:552). Lying is 
contrary to a “formal” duty to oneself “as a moral being” and “to [one’s] inner freedom, the 
innate dignity of a human being” and it involves making “one’s basic principle to have no basic 
principle and hence no character” (MM, 6:420/CEPP:545). Similarly, in the Religion within the 
Boundaries of mere Reason, Kant views lying as the root of all evil and intimately links self-
deception (lying to oneself) to the worst ways in which we can morally lose our way in life (Rel, 
6:37/CEPP:83-4). 
Returning to his essay on the right to lie, Kant clarifies that his argument is consistent 
with the analysis of lying from the point of view of virtue (first-personal ethics), according to 
which “Untruthfulness is a violation of duty to oneself” (SRL, 8:426n/CEPP:612). But, he 
continues, the essay focuses only on “a duty of right” (ibid.), which is why he avoids using 
formulations concerning our duties of virtue in the body of the text. For Kant, although virtue 
(first-personal ethics) and right (enforceable justice) are compatible and complementary, they are 
not co-extensive (MM, 6:230/CEPP:387). Virtue involves internal exercises of freedom (proper 
usage of our self-reflective reasoning capacities and actions motivated by these reflections as 
necessary). As we learn in the Groundwork and the second Critique, for Kant, to act virtuously is 
to act on universalizable maxims from the motivation of duty. In contrast, right tracks external 
exercises of freedom and interaction with others. We exercise external freedom rightfully when 
we interact in the world (in space and time) in ways reciprocally respectful of one another’s 
innate right to freedom (one’s “right of humanity in one’s own person”) and the corresponding 
duty of rightful honor (MM, 6:236f/CEPP:392 and MM, 6:240/CCEP:395, cf. MM, 
6:213f/CEPP374-376; MM, 6:218-221/CEPP:383-385). Our innate right to freedom is our right 
to “independence from being constrained by another’s choice… insofar as it [our exercise of 
freedom] can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law” (MM, 
6:237/CEPP: 397), whereas our rightful honor “consists in asserting one’s worth as a human 
being in relation to others” (MM, 6:236/CEPP:392). To understand what Kant is saying 
regarding right and lying in his short essay on the right to lying, we must first appreciate why 
Kant thinks that not all lies are legally wrong and why lying is a private legal wrong only when it 
deprives others of something to which they already have a right. 
Kant’s main analysis of right and lies is found in The Metaphysics of Morals. Here, Kant 
argues that a human being is “authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish 
what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it – such things as merely communicating his 
thoughts to them, telling or promising them something, whether what he says is true and sincere 
or untrue and insincere … for it is entirely up to them whether they want to believe him or not” 
(MM, 6:238/CEPP:394). Words do not have coercive (physical causal) powers and hence cannot 
deprive others of what is rightfully theirs. Rather, the general principle is that if I declare 
something as truthful and you take me up on my invitation to trust what I have said, I become a 
co-author for what happens next. Because of my lie, you don’t quite know what you’re actually 
doing any longer, which is why I become responsible for bad consequences of my lie. Moreover, 
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one way successfully to use words so as to deprive others of what is rightfully theirs is 
contractual fraud, which involves “the false allegation that a contract has been concluded with 
someone, made in order to deprive him of what is his” (MM, 6:238n/CEPP:394). Contractual 
fraud is a way of stealing by means of words. Another way to deprive others of what is theirs by 
means of words is to deny them of their rightful honor, of public recognition of the lives they 
have lived. Not only are these kinds of speech always ethically wrong, but insofar as they 
involve “slander” (false defamation) legal suits can be brought to court (MM, 6:466/CEPP:582). 
In sum, private lies are legally punishable when by lying one “violates another’s rights” by 
(intentionally or unintentionally) taking something that rightfully belongs to that person. In 
contrast, as we saw above, from the point of view of first-personal ethics (virtue), there are no 
such limitations; it is never virtuous to deceive oneself or others (MM, 6:429/CEPP:552). 
Kant makes it clear that “I indeed do no wrong to him who compels me to make the 
[lying] statement” (SRL, 8:436/CEPP:612). After all, it’s not just that the murderer neither has 
the right to my information nor the right to threaten me, but he/she also does not have a legal 
claim on me requiring that I, as a private person, do not lie in response to a question. Rather, as 
we have seen, the general rule is that if I make a statement (declaration) to another that I know to 
be untruthful, then I become legally responsible for its bad consequences. This is why Kant 
argues in the essay that even “a well-meant lie can … also become by accident (casus) 
punishable in accordance with civil laws” (SRL, 8:426/CEPP:612). In contrast, someone who is 
truthful in situations involving threatening murderers thereby chooses to abstain from the 
interaction, saving the full responsibility of what follows for the murderer. Of course, there are 
many ways to change the example such that the reasoning changes too, such as by invoking 
scenarios where a public court would simply find related lying unpunishable. Nevertheless, the 
main point is that being truthful in response to threats is not to commit a private legal wrong; it 
cannot bring legal liability for what happens next. 
Let us finally turn to Kant’s main concern in his response to Constant, namely that 
although lying to the murderer involves no “material” wrongdoing, it does involve “formal” 
wrongdoing. After clarifying that the murderer is not wronged by the lie (no material 
wrongdoing occurs), Kant continues by arguing, “I nevertheless do wrong in the most essential 
part of duty in general by such falsification, which can therefore be called a lie (though not in a 
jurist’s sense)” (SRL, 8: 426/CEPP 612). Similarly, after agreeing with Constant’s general claim 
that one must never abandon a true proposition, he continues: “But here one must understand not 
the danger of harming (contingently) but of doing wrong generally … and, though by a certain 
lie I in fact wrong no one, I nevertheless violate the principle of right with respect to all 
unavoidable necessary statements in general (I do wrong formally though not materially)” (SRL, 
8:429/CEPP:614f). Consider also this: “Thus a lie, defined merely as an intentionally untrue 
declaration to another, does not require what jurists insist upon adding for their definition, that it 
must harm another…. For it always harms another, even if not another individual, nevertheless 
humanity generally, inasmuch as it makes the source of right unusable” (MM, 6: 426/CEPP:612). 
Lying is not always to do a legal, material wrong to another, particular human being; a murderer 
doesn’t have a right to anyone’s helpful, truthful declarations. Nevertheless, when one lies, one 
commits a formal wrong; lying wrongs everyone (“humanity”) because the action is necessarily 
inconsistent with a moral, rightful (and, of course, virtuous) world.  
One way to make this argument clearer is to notice that Kant makes the same argument at 
the end of his account of private right in the Doctrine of Right in The Metaphysics of Morals – a 
work published the same year as the on the right to lie essay (1797). There he argues that if a 
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group of people who are interacting have “the intention to be and to remain in this state of 
externally lawless freedom [the state of nature],” then they “do one another no wrong at all when 
they feud among themselves… But in general they do wrong in the highest degree by willing to 
be and to remain in a condition that is not rightful” (MM, 6:307f/CEPP:452). By fighting it out, 
the interacting persons don’t (materially) wrong one another, but they do wrong in general 
(formally) by choosing to stay in a condition where justice is impossible. In a footnote here, Kant 
adds that “This distinction between what is merely formally wrong and what is also materially 
wrong has many applications,” (MM, 6:307f/CEPP:307), and my suggestion here is that in the 
essay on the right to lie, Kant aims to show one more situation (lying to the murderer at the 
door), in which the same distinction (between material and formal wrongdoing) is central to a 
good philosophical analysis of it. 
In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that no one has the right to refuse to enter or 
leave civil society: one can be rightfully forced to enter civil society, and no one can destroy civil 
society (return to the state of nature) (MM, 6:307-314/CEPP:452). Correspondingly, the 
argument in the essay on the right to lie can explain why no one can have a right to lie to a public 
authority or as a representative of the public authority. These can be punishable public crimes 
because public authority is not yet another private person, but a public person—a general will 
that represents everyone, and yet no one in particular. That is to say, when we undertake an 
action that attacks public institutions, we don’t commit private wrongs (wrong another private 
person), but we do public wrongs (wrong everyone and no one in particular). Hence, lying 
becomes a punishable wrong when done to or by a public authority exactly because the public 
authority represents everyone and no one in particular; formal wrongs become punishable. For 
example, lying under oath is perjury (a “crime against justice”) and if one lies as a public 
official, one can be charged with public wrongs such as corruption of or misconduct in public 
office. 
Does this last point mean that when people act in the name of a state, they can oblige us 
to tell him/her the truth? To use the most historically prominent response to Kant’s essay on 
lying to the murderer at the door: If the person at the door is a Nazi soldier searching for Jewish 
people hiding in my home, must I tell the truth to this soldier? On the above analysis, the answer 
to this question is a firm “no.” Representatives of horrible regimes, such as Nazi Germany, do 
not have the right to not be lied to because they do not represent a public authority. Nazi-
Germany was a violent effort to deprive some people of their right to freedom, making it what 
Kant in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View calls a “barbaric” regime (A, 
7:331/CEA:426 [1798]). Such a regime cannot be seen as exercising public authority since it was 
not grounded on a legal commitment to representing the basic rights of each. Accordingly, once 
a lawful regime was re-established in Germany, those taking part were held legally responsible 
for their violent actions in the name of the barbaric regime, and so guilty of private crimes as 
well as public crimes (“treason”); to what extent their actions were punishable would depend on 
the circumstances (of actual choices available and the presence of threats). Finally, we can also 
account for Kant’s view that lying to murderers—as war heroes did to Nazi soldiers—is never 
experienced as something morally uncomplicated (rightful or virtuous) to do, but as something 
profoundly regrettable, as something that comes at an irreducible moral cost: it always involves 
committing a formal wrong. Being a hero is therefore not something anyone wants to be, it is 
rather something one subsequently must learn to live with. One must to learn to live with how 
life put one into a situation where there were no morally unproblematic ways out, where with the 
hope of a better future and as motivated by affectionate love of humankind (“Menschenliebe”), 
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one chooses to commit actions (lying, killing) one does not have a right – and so cannot feel 
morally authorized – to do. 
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